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Legislative and policy interventions in response to the organ trade have cen-
tered on the introduction of criminal sanctions in an effort to deter organ sales
and/or “trafficking.” Yet, such measures fail to take account of the social and
political processes that facilitate the exploitation of individuals in organ mar-
kets in different contexts. Informed by empirical data, gathered via a series of
in-depth interviews with Sudanese migrants who have sold a kidney, this
paper examines the link between increased urbanization, migration patterns,
informalization, and the emergence of organ markets in the Egyptian-
Sudanese context. The findings illustrate how processes of legal marginaliza-
tion and social exclusion leave people vulnerable to exploitation in organ mar-
kets. The prevailing law enforcement response does not capture or respond
to the empirical reality. Accordingly, this paper shifts the emphasis away from
criminalization toward an analysis of the legal barriers and policy decisions
that shape the poor bargaining position of organ sellers. In doing so, it opens
up discussion of the organ trade onto wider critiques that disrupt boundaries
between formality and informality in labor markets and trouble dominant
modes of criminalization.
The organ trade is a complex social problem grounded in
deep-seated structural issues. However, discourses of violence
and criminalization predominant in media (Holmes 2016;
Pokharel 2015) and official reports (Council of Europe 2014;
OSCE 2013; UNODC 2010) characterize the organ trade as a sin-
gularly violent crime. Representing the organ trade in stark crim-
inal terms has predisposed legislative action toward crime control
and law enforcement. Consequently, criminal sanctions prohibit-
ing organ sales has become the focal point of legal intervention in
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response to a phenomenon embedded in social, political, and
economic malaise. This narrow emphasis on criminality overlooks
important intersections of agency, culture, identity, and politics,
diverting critical attention away from the broader social and eco-
nomic arrangements that leave people vulnerable to exploitation
in organ markets. Whereas the threat of organ “trafficking” con-
tinues to capture the imagination of political and legislative
experts, as evidenced by the Council of Europe Convention against
Trafficking in Organs (2014), there has been relatively less atten-
tion given to the types of environments and circumstances that
predispose certain individuals or groups toward organ sale.
Drawing on the experiences of Sudanese organ sellers, this paper
will go some way in filling this knowledge gap, exploring the dif-
ferent dynamics fueling and intersecting within organ trading
networks in Cairo, Egypt.
While a number of studies, largely in the field of anthropology,
consider the challenges of organ donation from moral, cultural,
and ethical perspectives (see Hamdy 2012; Lock 2002; Scheper-
Hughes and Waquaint 2000; Sharp 2006) there remains a dearth
of evidence-based research into the legal, social, and political fac-
tors that underpin organ markets and the networks that supply
them. Furthermore, there is a lack of critical engagement with the
implications of current legislative and policy mechanisms in
response to the organ trade. Building on existing studies on illicit
markets and organ donation (Goodwin 2006; Mendoza 2011;
Scheper-Hughes 2000; Yea 2010) this paper explores the link
between increased urbanization, migration patterns, informaliza-
tion, and the emergence of organ markets in the Egyptian-
Sudanese context. Informed by original empirical data, gathered
via a series of in-depth interviews, this paper provides much need-
ed insight into the processes of exploitation behind organ markets,
in a country identified as having an active trade in organs
(Shimazono 2007). Further, it considers the impact of new laws
introduced in Egypt to counter organ trading.
The experiences of Sudanese migrants demonstrate how pro-
cesses of social exclusion and economic marginalization can lead
to variable degrees of exploitation manifested, in this instance, in
their involvement in organ markets. Criminalization alone cannot
address these dynamics. Accordingly, analysis is redirected toward
the legal barriers and policy decisions that shape the poor bar-
gaining position of organ sellers in the Egyptian-Sudanese con-
text. While this study does not infer a definitive model or pattern
of organ trading, it does illustrate some of the legal arrange-
ments, policy decisions, and social conditions that contribute to
an anomic environment, which has fostered a subculture of organ
sales, amongst migrant populations in particular. The empirical
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findings will thus serve as an important counterpoint for compar-
ative analysis with other illicit markets (see Siegel 2008; Wyatt
2009) and the study of informal/formal relations and criminaliza-
tion more generally (see Anderson 2010; Coutin 2005; Dau-
vergne 2008; Meagher 2010; Tataryn 2016). In this regard, the
organ trade acts as a heuristic device to illustrate broader themes
of social exclusion and exploitation. The paper begins by explor-
ing the social and legal context in which Sudanese migrants have
sold a kidney. It then considers the implications of current legal
measures established in response to reports of organ trading in
Cairo.
Methodology
The methodology for this study took the form of a series of
in-depth narrative interviews with Sudanese migrants involved in
organ markets in Cairo, Egypt. Owing to its reputation as a
“hotspot of organ trafficking” (COFS 2011; McGrath 2009; Shi-
mazono 2007), Cairo was chosen as the key research site for this
study. Furthermore, conducting research in Cairo provided an
opportunity to assess the implications of criminalization, following
the introduction of the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tis-
sues Act (2010) which prohibits the sale or purchase of organs.
After preliminary discussions and enquiries with local NGO
groups,1 it became apparent that undocumented migrants, in
particular, were being targeted for their organs. Having estab-
lished a personal connection with a member of the Sudanese
community, I was introduced to individuals who had sold and/or
arranged for the sale of a kidney(s). The analysis that follows is
grounded in, and developed from, the situated perspective(s)
and experiences of these respondents.2
Interviews with organ sellers were arranged via a process of
snowball sampling. This “chain referral” method involved using
initial contacts to generate contexts and encounters that would
allow for an analysis of the different activities, actors, and rela-
tions that constitute organ trading networks (Atkinson and Flint
2001). In total, 27 in-depth interviews were carried out between
the months of May and July 2014. The interview respondents
consisted of thirteen organ sellers, four organ brokers, three
1 These organizations are not named in order to protect the anonymity of the
informants.
2 The interviews were conducted in accordance with the ESRC (2015) guidelines, the
author’s university policy, and with the consent of all respondents. All of the interviews were
audio recorded and transcribed anonymously. Accordingly, pseudonyms are used
throughout.
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medical professionals, and seven NGO staff.3 Seven of the organ
sellers were female; six were male. Of the organ brokers, three
were male and one was female. Male respondents (organ sellers)
were aged between 21 and 36. Female respondents (organ sell-
ers) were aged between 19 and 42. Only one of the organ
brokers confirmed his age. This particular individual was 28. The
other organ brokers appeared to be older, possibly in their late
30s. All but one of the respondents had sold a kidney after the
Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act of 2010 (Egypt)
was established to prohibit the sale or purchase of organs; adding
further suggestion that the law has had little impact on organ
trading, particularly amongst migrant groups (Hamdy 2012). Tri-
angulation was used to cross-verify data between sources (Fram
2013; Glaser and Strauss 2009/1967). The use of multiple meth-
ods helped avoid partial views, enhance research findings and
meanings attached to the data.
Urbanization and Migration Patterns: Cairo
With the globalization of advanced capitalism, cities have tak-
en on an increasingly dominant role in the global economy as
both centers of production and consumption (Castells 2011; Sas-
sen 2001). It is unsurprising then that there are now more peo-
ple living in urban areas than at any other point in history
(United Nations 2014), the vast majority of which are located in
large cities, or urban agglomerations expanding outward from
dominant metropolitan centers (Cohen 2006; Davis 2008).
According to a report by the United Nations Department of
Economic and Social Affairs in 2014, approximately 54 percent
of the global population reside in urban areas; a figure
expected to increase to 66 percent by 2050. In the global
South, the rate of urbanization is increasing at a much faster
rate than in the global North (Daniels 2004). For instance, 18 of
the world’s largest cities, or “mega-cities” with populations
exceeding 10 million, are located in the global South (United
Nations 2014). While there is an economic logic behind this
accelerated rate of urbanization, insofar as cities provide an
increasing share of job opportunities, many cities in the global
South—particularly in Africa—are expanding in spite of poor
3 The data in this paper is predominately centered on the experiences of organ sell-
ers. Demographic data (i.e., age, gender) is included where appropriate/available. Nine of
the respondents who sold a kidney were from South Sudan. The other respondents were
from Sudan.
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macro-economic performance and without significant foreign
direct investment (Cohen 2006).4
Part of the reason for this trend of urbanization is that policies
of agricultural deregulation have generated an exodus of surplus
rural labor, even as cities cease to offer employment opportunities
(Bayat 1997; Davis 2006). At the same time, civil wars uproot
whole communities who migrate to urban centers to escape perse-
cution and build new lives (Davis 2006).5 These combined process-
es have played a significant role in the growth of Cairo’s urban
population and the expansion of its metropolitan periphery (Bayat
1997). According to the United Nations World Urbanization Pros-
pects (United Nations 2014), the Greater Cairo region has a popu-
lation of over 18 million. The shift toward export-orientated
commercial agriculture has had an adverse effect on subsistence
farming and food production in local markets (Zohry 2002). Subse-
quently, rural peasants and smallholder farmers unable to compete
with cheap foreign imports and the dominance of industrial-scale
agribusiness have opted to migrate to urban areas, in search of other
means of income production. Many of these internal-migrants end
up in Cairo, or more specifically Greater Cairo, where already negli-
gible resources are placed under additional pressure. This pressure is
intensified by the arrival of foreign migrants.
In a context of prolonged civil unrest, constitutive of poor
labor conditions and limited access to public services, there has
been a mass exodus of Sudanese migrants, in particular, travel-
ling to the greater Cairo region in search of better employment
options and living conditions.6 Many Sudanese migrants (from
4 An estimated 72 percent of the urban population in Africa live in slums. See, United
Nations human settlements program (UN-HABITAT) 2003. The challenge of slums: global
report on human settlements. London: Earthscan.
5 Contrary to popular belief, the majority of migrations take place in the global South.
Debates about immigration are generally focused on dynamics between the global North
and South. However, migration patterns suggest that most migrants move within and
between low-income countries, the majority of which are situated in the global South. Geo-
graphical proximity is on obvious reason for the disproportionate movement of migrants in
the global South. Another reason is that increased policing on the borders of wealthier states
means that in many cases neighboring countries that lack the administrative or capacity to
police borders, are easier to access. Consequently, irregular employment is expanding in
the global South. For more information, see Chen, M. A. (2005). Rethinking the informal econ-
omy: Linkages with the formal economy and the formal regulatory environment. United Nations Uni-
versity, World Institute for Development Economics Research; Aas, K. F. (2011).
‘Crimmigrant’ bodies and bona fide travellers: Surveillance, citizenship and global
governance. Theoretical Criminology, 15(3), 331–346.
6 Since gaining its independence in 1956, Sudan has suffered from widespread con-
flict, natural disasters and economic instability, producing a large number of internally dis-
placed persons seeking job opportunities and/or political asylum in Egypt and beyond.
Unresolved constitutional and ethnic tensions between the Arab dominated north and the
non-Arab south, led to two successive civil wars. The Second Civil War, between 1983 and
2005, claimed an estimated two million lives and left a further four million people displaced.
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Sudan and South Sudan) travel to Cairo to seek employment,
while others make the journey in order to register with the Unit-
ed Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR).7 Registering with the
UNHCR allows migrants to apply for refugee status, in the hope of
resettlement to a third country that would offer better living condi-
tions and employment opportunities. However, the majority of indi-
viduals who register with the UNHCR remain in Cairo, joining the
ranks of the urban poor occupying marginal spaces of the urban
economy, with limited resources and opportunities for social mobility.
Sudanese Migrants: Legal Barriers to Citizenship
Sudanese migrants have historically shared a link with Egypt.
Under the Wadi El Nil Treaty8 (1976) Sudanese nationals could
enter Egypt without a visa. Moreover, they were granted rights of
residency, ownership, and employment, similar to Egyptian citi-
zens. However, with increasing numbers of Sudanese nationals
travelling to Egypt due to a succession of civil wars in the region,
the Egyptian government made a request to the UNHCR in 1994
to begin processing “asylum seekers” (Grabska 2006; Jacobsen,
Ayoub, and Johnson 2014). Further restrictions were imposed
when the Wadi El Nil Treaty was revoked after a failed assassination
attempt on President Mubarak, allegedly performed by Sudanese
Islamists (Turner 1995). Consequently, visa and residence permit
requirements were introduced for all Sudanese nationals en-route
to Egypt, regardless of their reasons for travel. These restrictions
remained in force until the Four Freedoms Agreement (2004) was
established.9 Thought of as a partial return to the Wadi El Nil Trea-
ty, the Four Freedoms Agreement accords Sudanese nationals “special
While continuing conflict in the western region of Darfur has driven two million people
from their homes and killed more than 200,000. For more information, see Marina Ottaway
and Mai Sl-Sadany, ‘Sudan: From Conflict to Conflict’ [Online] Retrieved 1 March 2016
from: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/sudan_conflict.pdf
7 UNHCR stands for United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. According to
its website the UNHCR provides protection, shelter, emergency food, water, medical care,
and other life-saving assistance to 43 million people worldwide, who have been forced to
flee their homes due to war and persecution. See, UNHRC, ‘Help the Uprooted and State-
less’ [Online] Retrieved 1 March 2016 from: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cbf.html
8 Owing to the historic ties between Sudan and Egypt, and as a consequence of the
widespread displacement of the Sudanese population, the two countries signed the Wadi El
Nil Treaty in 1976, which allowed Sudanese migrants to enter Egypt and obtain residency
without needing to file for asylum. See, Ahmed, Y. (2009). The prospects of assisted voluntary
return among the Sudanese population in Greater Cairo. IOM Cairo.
9 The agreement was made after a series of border disputes and negotiations over oil
transportation between the two states. Journalists have suggested that this agreement was
introduced to act as a bargaining chip during the negotiations. See, ‘Sudan-Egypt relations
hit speed bump over four freedoms accord’ 25 February 2013 [Online] Retrieved 1 March
2016 from: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45646
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status” which exempts them from visa requirements and guaran-
tees reciprocal rights of residence, work, and ownership of proper-
ty (Jacobsen, Ayoub, and Johnson 2014). However, there is an
important caveat limiting the scope of the agreement to “Sudanese
citizens.” Under the agreement “asylum seekers” are not extended
the same privileges as “Sudanese citizens,” who are considered
legal migrants. Their legal status and terms of residence remain
subject to UNHCR registration.
It is unclear who exactly qualifies as a “citizen,” with the
majority of Sudanese nationals in Egypt labelled by border offi-
cials as asylum seekers regardless of whether or not they are actu-
ally seeking asylum. Conceptually, forced migration refers to
individuals or groups that have arrived at a country without for-
mal documentation, having been compelled by an element of
coercion (i.e., environmental disasters, political persecution) to
seek asylum (International Organization Migration 2011). Such
individuals are normatively classified as asylum seekers. In con-
trast, labor migration refers to those who leave home for eco-
nomic reasons in search of employment (International
Organization Migration 2011). In practice, however, the distinc-
tion between forced migration and labor migration is blurred
(Anderson and Rogaly 2005). The conditions that propel either
forced or labor migration are interconnected; they are co-effects
of the same environment in which social inequality and political
and economic instability are embedded. Nevertheless, labor
migrants who do not possess the necessary travel documents can
be perceived to have committed a criminal offence (illegal immi-
gration), unless they are claiming asylum (Coutin 2005; Dau-
vergne 2008; Hamlin 2014; Thomas 2010). Therefore, migrants
who are unable to obtain formal work or travel documents have
a strong incentive to claim asylum, regardless of their purpose
for travel. For example, for those fearing political persecution, it
can be extremely difficult to obtain formal documents from the
requisite consulate officers in Egypt. Hence, if there is any clear
implication of the Four Freedoms Agreement, it is not the expansion
of protections for migrant workers, but rather the reduction of
legal protection for Sudanese asylum seekers who are formally
excluded from its provisions (Thomas 2010). Formally excluded
by the Egyptian administration, the majority of Sudanese
migrants register with the UNHCR, to avail of whatever legal
“entitlements” are available to them.
In order to secure permanent residency rights accorded via
refugee status, an asylum seeker must first register with the
UNHCR, who then schedule a refugee status determination
(RSD) interview. Upon registering an asylum seeker is allocated a
“yellow card.” The yellow card enables asylum seekers to stay in
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Egypt under the protection of the UNHCR until their RSD meet-
ing takes place. However, this process can take several months to
several years. Those rejected are entitled to appeal but if the
appeal fails their file is closed permanently. They are no longer
“people of concern” and are expected to depart the country
(UNHCR 2014). However, the majority of migrant workers who
have their files closed remain in Egypt, occupying a sort of legal
limbo with “illegal” status and limited access to rights and services
(Anderson and Ruhs 2010; De Genova 2002; Grabska 2006;
Jacobsen, Ayoub, and Johnson 2014; Jones-Correa and de
Graauw 2013). For those who qualify for a “blue card,” affording
them recognized refugee status, the benefits are marginal. The
main difference between a recognized refugee and an asylum
seeker is that recognized refugees are eligible for UNHCR’s
“durable solutions”: local integration, voluntary repatriation, or
resettlement (Jacobsen, Ayoub, and Johnson 2014). In practice,
however, only the “most vulnerable cases” are deemed serious
enough to satisfy a re-settlement request.10 Therefore, for the
majority of refugees, a sort of de facto local integration occurs,
with no substantive rights to employment or housing. In this way,
the laws regulating refugee status and immigration can be seen
to produce illegality and thereby construct vulnerability (Ander-
son and Ruhs 2010; Coutin 2005; De Genova 2002; Jones-Correa
and de Graauw 2013). In Egypt, asylum seekers have come to
represent unauthorized access, which has been branded as illegal.
This ostensibly allows the state more control over admission and
access to public services. However, in practice, the denial of access
is not an effective deterrent: migrants stay and consequently
occupy positions of “sub” citizenship (Anderson 2013). Such
“illegal” or “undocumented11” migrants are socially, politically,
and economically subjugated, existing external to formal legal
rules, and are therefore vulnerable to various forms of exploita-
tion. The organ trade is exemplary of this process.
Abido, a Sudanese migrant with aspirations to work in
Europe, spoke about his experience registering with the
UNHCR. According to Abido, he was given £300 LE12 ($33
USD) per month, for a period of two months. After two months
10 In 2004, the UN Commissioner suspended all refugee status determination inter-
views for Sudanese migrants, after the ceasefire between the North and South of Sudan.
This led to protests outside the United Nations headquarters in Cairo. Civil disobedience
was brutally and abrupt brought to a halt. Over 28 protesters were killed. See http://www.
refugee-rights.org/Newsletters/NorthAfrica/V3N1RefugeesKilledinCairoProtest.htm
11 For the purposes of this paper, I will refer to migrants without formal travel docu-
ments or visas as undocumented.
12 LE stands for livre egyptienne, French for Egyptian pound.
Columb 289
had elapsed the payment was cancelled and his file was closed,
without any explanation:
How can I survive on £300 LE for a month? This will not
even cover my rent. The UN does not care about me. You
register, get your card and then you are forgotten. I have
tried many times to speak to the UN but no one will see me.
I do not exist for them.
He continued:
People think refugees get a lot, but they have nothing. You
have no real protection with the yellow card. It just means
that your file is opened and you are being considered for
interview, to determine whether you will get refugee status. If
you cannot find work when you get to Egypt, you will not
find mercy. This is why people sell their kidneys.
Despite being signatories of the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees, Egypt has placed several reservations on
the implementation of the Convention, opting out of key pro-
visions (Articles 12(1), 20, 22 (1), 23, 24) concerning personal
status, access to education, labor rights, and social security. For
example, refugees residing in Egypt are not eligible to apply
for Egyptian nationality. According to the government, their
residence is considered temporary, and thus no real integration
occurs. Access to education is also limited. Refugee schools are
not recognized by the Egyptian government. Therefore, refu-
gees cannot progress to third level education. Rather Sudanese
migrants, almost universally classified as asylum seekers/refu-
gees regardless of their reason for travel, are encouraged to
attend UNHCR workshops where the can learn “essential
skills.” One respondent (female, Sudanese migrant, aged 36)
commenting on the educational programs provided by the
UNHCR claimed:
They only teach us how to be good servants. We learn how
to cook the Egyptian way and learn how to read children’s
books so that we can read for their children. They do not
want us to be educated. They need to keep us in our place.
We are only welcome here so that we can clean their homes
and mind their children.
Although refugees can apply for a work permit, this is a diffi-
cult and costly procedure. To qualify for a work permit, a refugee
must first demonstrate that they are uniquely qualified; in other
words prove that an Egyptian could not perform the work in
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question. They must then convince a prospective employer to
purchase a work permit on their behalf or cover the cost them-
selves. The cost of an annual work permit for a Sudanese refugee
is £200 LE ($22 USD).13 This may seem like an acceptable figure,
but for someone with no viable source of income this can be a
significant barrier to finding gainful employment. Consequently,
many migrants have little choice but to find work in the informal
economy (International Organization for Migration 2015).
Informalization, Precarious Labor, and Organ Sale
Following the deregulatory trend of advanced capitalism, for-
mal employment options in Egypt—and indeed across the global
North and South—are increasingly limited to only the highest
skilled “professionals” with expertise in innovative sectors of the
global economy, i.e., the bio-medical sector (Castells 2011; Daniels
2001). Conversely, global competition for lower skilled jobs has
meant that the diffusion of labor across borders has coincided
with a process of informalization (Castells 2011). In other words,
with fewer employment options in the formal labor market low-
skilled workers have no option but to accept conditions well
below recognized labor standards (see Tataryn 2016). This has
led to an expansion of informal labor practices, constitutive of
the “informal economy,” as people look beyond institutional
means of income production in an effort to sustain themselves.
The activities that comprise the various sectors of the informal
economy are unregulated by the social institutions that regulate
similar activities in the formal economy (Castells, Portes, and
Benton 1989). This absence of regulation affects the status of
labor, lowering the costs of production by disregarding existing
labor standards and regulations. In effect, workers’ rights and
protections are surrendered in a trade-off for increased produc-
tion. Shifts to limit access to workers’ rights and protections occur
across all levels of employment and labor practices (Standing
2011). Yet migrants deemed “illegal,” “irregular,” or
“undocumented” in informal economic arrangements are
exposed and subjected to higher levels of exploitation (Bloch and
McKay 2016; Tataryn 2016).
According to Castells, Portes, and Benton (1989), the inform-
alization of labor relations operates as a disguised form of wage
labor which deprives workers of their bargaining power. Whereas
jobs in the formal sector are relatively secure, informal workers
13 Incidentally other nationalities are required to pay significantly more. The cost for
Eritreans is £4,530 LE ($681 USD).
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lack access to formally recognized labor standards and protec-
tions, i.e., minimum wage, collective bargaining rights, safe work-
ing conditions, etc. (ILO 2012). Consequently, they are at greater
risk of exploitation. Notwithstanding the probability of abuse,
governments tolerate or even stimulate informal activities as a
way to resolve potential social conflicts while maintaining broader
economic interests (Castells, Portes, and Benton 1989; Daniels
2001). For example, permitting the growth of squatter communi-
ties and informal settlements in greater Cairo provides the gov-
ernment with a solution to the shortage of affordable housing,
while freeing up resources to support the government’s more
vested interests, i.e., military power and consolidation of the secu-
rity apparatus (Adham 2005; Bayat 1997). Similarly, excluding
migrants (Sudanese or otherwise) from legal protection follows
the logic of the state in reinforcing Egypt’s migrant labor regime,
supporting nascent sectors of its economy such as the transplant
industry.
According to ILO (2012) estimates, the informal economy
accounts for approximately 69 percent of Egypt’s GDP. Given the
inherent difficulties in measuring, the economic impact of activities
that are by definition “hidden” such estimates inevitably betray a
certain level of inaccuracy. However, considering the informal
economy largely consists of unreported income from the produc-
tion of legal goods and services, the actual figure is likely to be
even higher (Buehn and Schneider 2012; Nordstrom 2000). Thus,
from an economic governance perspective, it would be disingenu-
ous to invest resources into the protection of migrant workers, as
this would potentially compromise the economic aspirations of the
State. Rather, the classification of Sudanese migrants entering
Egypt as “asylum seekers” underpins a regime of strategic neglect,
marked by legal barriers to citizenship that position migrants as a
source of captive labor in the informal economy. In 2007, the
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights reported that only about
13,000 of the estimated 2–5 million Sudanese nationals living in
Egypt are officially recognized as refugees. Barred from entry into
the formal labor market and with little chance of migrating beyond
Cairo, undocumented migrants provide a source of captive labor,
with little or no bargaining power to negotiate fair wages or
acceptable working conditions.
Contrary to a common misperception of migrants as passive
subjects or victims lacking agency and control over their lives, the
narratives of Sudanese migrants interviewed as part of this study
convey the experiences of resourceful people, willing to take risks
and motivated beyond the norm to advance their life choices (see
Agustın 2007; Isin and Nielsen 2008). Many had spent their life
savings in order to get to Egypt, in the hope for a better life. The
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respondents in this study explained that their intention was to
work, save money and move on to another country with better
job opportunities and access to services. Yet, registered by the
UNHCR as asylum seekers migrants cannot move beyond Egyp-
tian territory. They have little choice but to remain and compete
with Cairo’s urban poor for limited employment opportunities,
while they await a decision on their refugee status.14 Eight of the
respondents interviewed as part of this study had their files
closed shortly after arriving, leaving them without legal protec-
tion and assistance. Speaking at length about her difficulties sus-
taining herself since emigrating from South Sudan, Nasrin (aged
28) explained:
I was forced to marry a man in Juba. He left me with one child.
After that, I went to Cairo to find a job. I found work in the house
[housekeeper] but they [UNHCR] closed my file. I went back to
them [the UNHCR] many times after that but they refused to lis-
ten. I would wait in line outside for 5 or 6 hours. No one told me
how long I could expect to wait. I lost my job doing this. I was try-
ing to get my file re-opened; I did not want to stay in Egypt. The
only work I can find here is a house girl, or maybe I could work at
a club. I was a nurse in Juba; I expected more from my life than
this. They do not pay me the same as an Egyptian. I would like to
got back to Sudan but I cannot afford this; and the UN cancelled
my passport when I came here. But I would not go back even if I
could. I have failed since coming here. My family would know that
I am shamed. People like me are the easy ones to sell a kidney.
Anita, a Sudanese migrant (aged 24) who travelled to Cairo
to find work and advance her education, experienced similar
difficulties:
The political situation in Sudan makes it impossible to work and
unless you have money you will not get an education. You cannot
find employment here unless you know someone working with the
government. I came here by secret. I paid someone to do the pro-
cess for me. I went to Khartoum and then from Halfa to Aswan. I
came here (Cairo) to find work and get and education, but it has
not been like that. I had to sell my kidney to help myself. If I did
not do this, who would help me?
With a lack of altruistic and deceased donations, the organ
trade has emerged as an economic solution to the shortage of
14 Charities are set up to help women find work as housekeepers. This work falls short
of most migrant women’s aspirations. A number of respondents commented on their dissat-
isfaction with the type of work available.
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transplantable organs. For the majority of respondents inter-
viewed as part of this study, organ sale represented an economic
option of last resort. As the narratives below illustrate, respond-
ents felt compelled to consider risky medical procedures carried
out with little or no oversight, despite having no possibility of
legal recourse should they be subject to any harm, be that medi-
cal or otherwise. Yet, in a context of legal marginalization and
social exclusion, selling a kidney was widely considered the least
bad option, notwithstanding the inherent risks involved.
Organ Markets
Globally, approximately 58 percent of kidneys used in trans-
plantation come from deceased donors; live donations account
for 41 percent (GODT 2014). In Egypt, however, kidney trans-
plantation is almost completely reliant on live donations. Uncer-
tainty over the legal and ethical parameters of cadaveric organ
programs has meant that transplantation in Egypt has been
dependent on living donations, usually from paid donors, since
transplant technologies were first introduced in 1976 (Barsoum
1994). With a lack of altruistic and deceased donations, organ
markets have been a constant feature of transplantation in Egypt.
Propelled by the demands of industry, the development of trans-
plant capabilities have continued unimpeded by social concerns.
Consequently, Egypt is now the largest market for organ trading
in North Africa, attracting buyers and sellers from neighboring
states. This market trades on the bodies of the poor, the disen-
franchised, and the undocumented.
For decades, legislators could not agree on how to provide a
framework to regulate organ transplantation, due to divisions with-
in the medical and religious communities over the legitimacy of
cadaveric donation. From a medical perspective, it was argued that
the procurement of organs from brain-dead patients was unethical
because the patients were not yet dead; a patient could not be con-
sidered dead until all his/her organs had failed (Hamdy 2012).
Religious organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, argued
that the soul of a brain-dead patient was still “lingering” and had
not yet passed over to the other side (for further discussion, see
Hamdy 2012). This belief was reinforced by the concern that the
body could not pass over to the after-life “in-parts”; the body must
leave this world the same way it had entered.
Providing a more novel perspective, one physician at a trans-
plant clinic in Cairo suggested that Egyptians had a cultural
attachment to the dead, going back to the time of the Pharaohs
and the rituals associated with mummification, which might
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explain the cultural resistance to cadaveric donation in Egypt
(personal correspondence 2014). Ironically, this attachment to
the bodies of the dead does not apply to the bodies of paid living
donors. Speaking to a number of patients at a dialysis clinic in
Cairo, it was apparent that despite medical reports affirming the
health of organ donors living with one kidney, patients continued
to worry about the harm that might befall a close friend or family
member, in the course of a kidney donation. They feared the dis-
ruption of family ties and the guilt that they would face for hav-
ing accepted a kidney from a loved one. Persisting with dialysis
or purchasing an organ from a stranger was the preferred
option. A health-worker volunteering for a local NGO explained:
People will not donate their kidney if there is an alternative.
If my daughter needed a kidney I would rather pay to get it
off someone I don’t know rather than my other child.
Given the significant cultural resistance to organ donation in
Egypt, combined with logistical and infrastructural limitations
inhibiting the successful operation of a nationally regulated organ
donor program, the growth of the transplant industry will contin-
ue to depend on live donations, predominately sourced from
organ markets. Although it is now illegal to sell or purchase a
kidney in Egypt, since the establishment of the Transplantation of
Human Organs and Tissues Act (2010), the experiences of organ
sellers (discussed below) suggest that the introduction of criminal
sanctions has had little bearing on the commercial supply of
organs. Despite the establishment of legislation prohibiting organ
sales, the continued reliance on organ markets would suggest
that the substantive merit of the law rests on its symbolic value, in
appeasing international standards. Notwithstanding the illegal
nature of the organ trade, the sale of organs is tacitly accepted and
rationalized as a mutually beneficial transaction, improving the eco-
nomic situation of the organ provider whilst potentially saving the
life of the organ recipient. Indeed, many consider it unethical not to
pay a donor. As one transplant professional in Cairo put it:
How do you convince someone who has no employment, no
access to education for their children, no support from the
community or government to donate their organs for noth-
ing? How can I ask them to donate an organ and get nothing
in return? If that person was to accept they would not be
sane. No rational person would do this.
In a further interview with the same respondent, it was sug-
gested that the health authorities in Egypt were in positive denial
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of the organ trade. That is, while the organ trade is publically
maligned, in practice organ markets are considered a solution to
the surplus demand for organs. Moreover, ensuring a steady sup-
ply of organs maintains Egypt’s economic aspirations of providing
the best medical attention money can buy in North Africa:
Global political pressure comes to nothing, because the public
here in Egypt are not upset about this. People go to the lab and
arrange payment. They are happy that there is availability. Busi-
ness is good for the medical community so they are happy. They
do not care where the organ source comes from, once they have
work to do. The middlemen are also happy, because they can
make a lot of money from this business. This is why there is no
pressure. Why bring in an alternative for the sake of ethics? The
moral argument does not accommodate the reality.
In the same way informal networks free formally recognized
firms from the constraints imposed upon them by regulatory con-
trols and institutional norms, transplant clinics depend on infor-
mal networks to supply organs, invariably sourced by individuals
in financial hardship. The conditions that compel individuals to
sell are overlooked in the urgency to procure organs for trans-
plantation. The lucrative promise that transplant medicine com-
mands triumphs over any concern for the welfare of the donor-
seller. There is little sympathy afforded to organ donors who are
perceived to have participated in criminal activity. Their claim to
corporeal sanctity is forfeit when they “decide” to sell a kidney.
Ethical concerns are further removed when an organ is sourced
from a foreign body discursively associated with criminality.
Thus, while many poor Egyptians are involved in organ trading
(Budiani and Karim 2008; Hamdy 2013) undocumented
migrants, in particular, represent a key source of supply for
organ markets. Disqualified from the legal protection of the polity
their bodies are rendered more “bio-available” than others.
Migrant “Donors” and the Selective Limits of State
Protection
Migrants provide a preferential source of organs over local
residents because of their perceived vulnerability. With expired
passports, invalid visas, and no work permits, undocumented
migrants, in particular, are at constant risk of arrest and deten-
tion, and are in no position to negotiate the terms of their
employment. Opportunistic employers often take advantage of
this vulnerability, compelling migrants to work long hours for a
derisory wage. With no recognized rights or entitlements to work
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guaranteed under Egyptian law, migrants have no legal recourse
for the harms committed against them, and are left little choice
but to accept conditions that would otherwise be unacceptable. In
other words, due to a lack of bargaining power migrants are par-
ticularly prone to exploitive labor conditions.
Each of the Sudanese respondents interviewed as part of
this study reported working long hours for an insufficient wage.
For those working as housekeepers, drivers and security guards,
a typical working week consisted of twelve working hours per
day, 6 days a week. The average wage for a female housekeeper
was £800 LE, approximately $90 USD per month. Male
respondents earned even less, earning on average £700 LE per
month, approximately $78 USD.15 Job security was also an
issue. In total, seven respondents reported instances of arbitrary
dismissal, lamenting their inability to challenge unfair working
conditions. Malik, speaking about his experience working as a
security guard in Alexandria, without a work permit, explained
his dilemma:
I travel from Cairo to Alexandria every day to do this job.
Most of my money is spent on transport. I work for over
twelve hours and some days I don’t even get a break. If I
complain, they will just ask me for my work permit. What
can I do?
Another respondent, Joyce, was dismissed from her position
as a housekeeper, for attending a RSD meeting, which she had
informed the “Madame” about, two weeks in advance. However,
the Madame claimed that she had never been informed of this,
and consequently dismissed Joyce, insisting that she could not be
relied upon. Unable to depend on a stable wage, the majority of
respondents had to supplement their income in other ways,
engaging in multiple economic activities in an effort to cover rent
and daily expenses. For example, some of the female participants
supplemented their income earned as housekeepers by styling
hair, applying henna tattoos or engaging in sex-work. Selling a
kidney was another option. With limited opportunities to earn a
living the promise of a substantial cash payment in return for a
kidney was a significant incentive for migrants with ambitions to
increase their social mobility.
Another reason why migrants are targeted for their kidneys is
that procuring an organ from foreign migrants raises less
15 Housekeepers are in high demand in Egypt. Therefore, the average female wage is
higher than that for their male counterpart.
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suspicion. Despite the fact that under Egyptian transplant law, it
is illegal to receive an organ from a foreign national (altruistically
or otherwise) law enforcement officials are less likely to investi-
gate a suspected organ sale involving Sudanese migrants. This
investigative apathy into alleged criminal activity is sharpened by
a cultural detachment to the affairs of foreign bodies, particularly
asylum seekers and refugees who are not extended state
protection. Owing to their precarious legal status, they are con-
sidered more expendable than other sections of the population.
Therefore, absent any kind of public pressure to open an investi-
gation, it is of little concern to the authorities whether or not a
migrant has been coerced into selling his/her kidney. This selec-
tive indifference to the welfare of Sudanese migrants was a com-
mon theme in the narratives of organ sellers. Talia, a Sudanese
migrant (aged 23) solicited for her kidney, revealed that she was
subject to ongoing intimidation and threats from an organ bro-
ker, after she had informed him that she no longer wanted to
proceed with the operation. Asked why she did not report this to
the police she explained:
The police don’t care about you. They just file a report but
no one investigates. My door was broken because I am stay-
ing alone, and they know this. So I went to the police to file
a report but they never even came to look at my house. I do
not know what to do. I just lock myself in my room and
hope they go away.
Experiences of hostility from the host community were inter-
posed with reports of police brutality and state corruption. Ten-
sions were evident between the Sudanese community and the
domestic (Egyptian) poor, competing for work and opportunity
in a context of social exclusion. From the interviews (and general
conversation with local Egyptians), it was apparent that immi-
grants were blamed for the economic difficulties experienced by
the urban poor; a convenient way to re-direct attention away
from failed state polices (see Bayat 1997). Stories of being robbed
were common as were accusations of corruption amongst various
Egyptian organizations, working under the auspices (and fund-
ing) of the government.
Experiences of sexual and gender-based violence were com-
mon amongst the female respondents; each of whom had
reported feeling unsafe living in Cairo, and insisted that they
were in need of protection. They argued that no one cared what
happened to them. The police would not take their reports seri-
ously and local Egyptians would always defend their “own,”
regardless of the circumstances.
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It is not safe for women here. Nobody will protect me when
I go outside. I fear it. If they know that you are living alone
with no man they can come and break into your house and
rape you and take everything valuable in your house, and
nobody will protect you. The police, government will not pro-
tect you. They can’t protect even themselves so how will they
protect a refugee.
(Sudanese migrant, Female, aged 19, Cairo 2014)
If you fight with an Egyptian, they will all gang up on you
and beat you. Many people are arrested for having disputes
with Egyptians. If you go to prison you will be beaten unless
you can pay money. When you are there they can treat you
like a woman.
(Sudanese migrant, male, aged 32, Cairo, 2014)
A number of respondents insisted that Egyptian nationals
purchase refugee identity cards from UNHCR representatives in
order to file a request for resettlement overseas, with Europe and
the United States being the preferred destinations.
The UN is staffed by over-privileged Egyptians who do not
care about our situation. They have no education of these
issues. I know some of them use their position to make mon-
ey. Others want to get out of here themselves. This is why
they take this job.
(Sudanese migrant, female, Cairo 2014)
Another respondent, Patrick, claimed to have been solicited
for his kidney by law enforcement officials, when arrested during
a refugee protest outside the UNHCR in 2005.
When I was arrested four different police were asking about
kidneys. They said that they would release us if we agreed to
sell our kidneys. Now you must understand why no one will
go to the police about this.
(Sudanese migrant, aged 22, Cairo 2014)
Patrick had been arrested a number of times before this and
claims to have been beaten on each occasion. On this instance, he
described being stripped naked, beaten with a metal pipe, and
burned with cigarettes. Another respondent who claimed to have
been subject to arbitrary arrest, described the difficulties he faced
after being released from prison. Mohammed (Sudanese migrant,
aged 29) was arrested after getting into a confrontation with his
employer over payment. Having no source of income upon
release Mohammed soon found himself homeless:
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When you are homeless people do not respect you and they
treat you like dirt. Living on the street I felt in constant dan-
ger. . .When people feel you are weak and alone they will take
advantage.
Mohammed was reticent for some time before revealing that
he was offered US$10,000 for his kidney. He claimed that the
money he had received was taken from him by force shortly after
the operation (from whom he did not say). Having lost his kidney,
he expressed feeling a constant sense of shame and hopelessness:
I do not feel human anymore. I drink to forget about what
has happened. Sometimes I feel like killing myself because of
pain and depression. I do not know what to do with myself.
After his transplant operation, Mohammed went to the
UNHCR for assistance and was referred to its partner organiza-
tion Caritas. He was prescribed sleeping pills and discharged
without further inquiry. He claimed that the medical staff work-
ing for Caritas are not trained professionals and routinely pre-
scribe the wrong medication for refugees. He alleged to know of
a gentleman from Sudan whose leg was amputated as a result of
misdiagnosis. Mohammed attributed much of his misfortune to
his perceived lack of support. At the time the interview took
place, he was sleeping in front of the UNHCR building in Cairo,
in protest of an institution he feels betrayed by. He explained
how he had believed that once he made contact with the UNHCR
his problems would be over.16 Mohammed was not alone in his
condemnation. Five respondents complained about the treatment
they received from Caritas, in particular:
This is not right how we are being treated. They keep post-
poning meetings. The UNHCR does not want to know about
my kidney. If you go to Caritas they tell you must pay first
and then they will reimburse you for half. The whole experi-
ence is humiliating. They dismiss everything we [refugees] say
and constantly defer meetings. We wait, and when we come
after a month they make us wait and then send us home.
When you call no one answers the phone.
(Sudanese Migrant, Female, aged 32)
In sum, with little trust in local authorities, migrants are less
likely to report instances of abuse. Rather, they have to find ways
16 Mohammed passed away during the writing of this paper (2016).
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to help themselves. Despite the many risks involved, selling a kid-
ney is one such strategy.
The Social Determinants of Organ Sales
For the individuals interviewed as part of this study, selling a
kidney was not so much a rational decision but rather a conse-
quential imposition, informed by the everyday challenges to sus-
tain oneself and/or one’s family. It was one of many
circumstantial outcomes related to a variable set of factors negoti-
ating the migrant condition. In this regard, involvement in the
organ trade was not causally linked to the criminal operations of
traditional organized crime groups or organ trafficking rings, as
suggested by numerous media reports (see, for example, Holmes
2016; Pokharel 2015) but was rather symptomatic of a kind of
circumstantial criminality, an irregular adaptation to a challeng-
ing market environment. In an environment with limited resour-
ces, kidneys were often the most valuable resource respondents
had in their possession. With limited employment opportunities
in either the formal or informal sectors, the organ trade was, for
some, the only source of income available. For others, it repre-
sented an opportunity to enhance their labor market prospects.
When you are suffering and short of money and you need to
help your kids you can donate your kidney.
(Joyce, female, Sudanese migrant, Cairo 2014)
It is better to sell a kidney than live on the street. I have to help
myself. This was the only way for me. But the money was finished
after six months.
(Kalib, male, Sudanese migrant, Cairo 2014)
One broker, speaking with his back turned, explained that he
did not want to recruit people for organ sale. He was uncomfort-
able with being labelled a criminal or a broker explaining that he
was “only trying to make money like anyone else.”
I do not want to this, but what choice to have. People feel cheated
by the UN not me. This is why they are protesting. This is an
easy way to make money. There are a number of hospitals
involved. If you want to blame somebody, blame the hospitals
and the government. They are the ones who make the money.
The majority of female participants who had sold one of their
kidneys were single mothers. They described the challenges of
raising children on a low budget. Despite working long hours as
housekeepers their remuneration was wholly insufficient to meet
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the costs of running a household. The women that were inter-
viewed had between two and five children, respectively. They
explained that with their limited budget they could not afford to
send all of their children to school, if any. Moreover, they could
not pay for childcare. Often a number of families would live
together in the same household, splitting costs and sharing
responsibilities. Yet, there was not always someone available to
watch over their children, which meant leaving them alone for
extended periods of time. Hiba, a single mother working as a
housekeeper, described an incident where a child who had been
left on his own for the day had fallen from a balcony and died.
Notwithstanding this apparent danger, Hiba insisted that she had
little choice but to continue working, even when her children
were unsupervised. Her immediate concern was the more proba-
ble risk of losing her job, falling deeper into arrears and being
evicted from her home. Struggling to keep up with payments
and concerned for the wellbeing of their children, the sale of a
kidney represented an opportunity to transform their lives.
Amirah, a Sudanese sex-worker, explained how she had hoped to
use the money she received from selling her kidney to improve
her life choices:
I do not want to work in clubs but this is better than working
as a cleaner. I cannot feed my family any other way. I
thought that if I sold my kidney I could start my own busi-
ness selling clothes. This would be a better way for me.
These respondents were motivated by a desire to advance
their life chances. For the majority of female respondents, it was
their hope that in selling one of their kidneys they could send
their children to school, start up a business, or relocate to anoth-
er country with better labor options and/or conditions.
The male respondents were similarly motivated. Three of the
male participants described feeling emasculated by their jobless-
ness (see, also, Jefferson 2002; Yea 2015). They were uneasy stay-
ing at home with their children, while their wives were away
working. Musa, commenting on his unemployment, explained
that in South-Sudan “the man must provide for the family. You
cannot have a wife unless you have something to give them.” For
Musa, the sale of his kidney was the ultimate sacrifice, a way to
re-establish and verify his male identity. It was better to be an
“organ seller” than an impotent husband.
I cannot find work here, so I stay at home and take care of
our children. I wanted to sell my kidney to make a new life for
my family. It is my responsibility to make sure that they are
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OK. Back then we had no home. We were staying with other
people, but I knew their generosity could only last for so long.
The children were crying with hunger. So, I went to Attaba
and I told one guy about my problems, and he suggested that
I sell my kidney. I had to make this sacrifice for my family.
Unplanned events were also a factor, precipitating respond-
ents toward the sale of one of their kidneys. Living on the mar-
gins of society, circumstances can change from bad to worse in an
instance. After his mother was involved in an accident resulting
in a severed spinal cord and a broken thighbone, Kamal sold his
kidney in order to cover her medical expenses:
I could not find a job here [Cairo] for three years. It was
very difficult. I stayed with some people but they treated me
very bad. They made me sleep outside on the balcony. They
did not respect me because I had no job. I stayed with them
for a year. All this time I was looking for work. I was very
worried because my mother was sick and I needed money for
her treatment. I eventually found work with a ceramic compa-
ny in Maadi. I was only paid £10 LE (£1 GBP) per day. I
worked around 9 hours per day. I was 16 and could not
negotiate a higher wage. They did not take me seriously
because they knew I was desperate. I had to find money to
help my mother. No one approached me about my kidney. I
needed money. I spoke to someone who told me this was
very safe and that I would make a lot of money. I was offered
$7,000 USD. I agreed to do this for my mother. My mother
is very sick and needs an operation for her leg and back.
This will cost $25,000 USD. But the money was not enough.
She still has not got the operation.
He added:
After selling my kidney I lost my appetite. I am not strong
like before. I stayed with a friend after the operation, because
I did not want my mother to know what I did.
Others sold a kidney after losing their jobs, under circum-
stances beyond their control. Two of the respondents had fallen
ill and were subsequently dismissed by their employers. Another
had been arrested for driving without a license, and lost his job
while in prison:
I was driving to Suez with my niece and nephew when they
stopped me. I had a yellow card but the police wanted to see
my license. They told me to leave the car and go, but I
refused because this car was my responsibility. So they
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arrested me and the children also. Relatives had to pay the
police not to abuse me. They beat me with a stick and would
put water over me and kick me to get up. I was just given
halawa and cheese to eat - If your family do not bring you
food you don’t eat. They held me there for three months. I
never spoke to a lawyer, no one. During this time the UN
closed my file. This was in 2008. My relative had to pay
$3,000 USD so that I could be released. We had to pay more
so that the children would receive favorable treatment. After I
was released from prison I could not find work for a year. I
lost my job after I was arrested. So when I was released I
had nothing and I needed to pay my relative for his help.
This is when I decided to donate my kidney [2010].
(Sudanese migrant, male, Cairo 2014)
Najla travelled to Cairo in order to advance her education.
She claimed to have purchased a visa from a contact with the
Sudanese embassy prior to departing. But what little money she
had when she arrived was stolen:
I was staying at a friend’s apartment. One night someone
broke into our home and I lost everything. I had no money.
Then I met some guy. He is in the jail now. He said that I
would get the money the easy way, a lot of money. I was
promised $40,000 USD to sell my kidney. He told me that
this was a safe procedure that would benefit everybody.
Najla received £40,000 Egyptian pounds upon completing
the surgery, which when converted to US dollars amounts to
around $4,500, significantly less than what she was promised. As
soon as she received the payment, Najla was asked to leave, with-
out receiving any information about the procedure or the type of
aftercare that was needed.17 Najla felt too ashamed to tell anyone
about her experience, and spent a significant portion of the pay-
ment covering the costs of a hotel room while she recovered.
Najla frequently experiences sharp pains in her lower abdomen
and can no longer perform tasks that involve heavy-lifting.
While the majority of respondents were aware that they were
“agreeing” to sell a kidney, some of them were coerced and/or
deceived into having their kidneys removed. Two of the respond-
ents had been taken to a local hospital on the pretense that they
were receiving medical treatment. Zarif was suffering from a severe
intestinal disorder and required urgent medical attention. He
17 Sallie Yea (2015) has noted how nervous medical staff in the Philippines discharge
patients “suspected” of organ sales, as quickly as possible, without having received sufficient
aftercare.
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claimed that he could not find work until he received treatment. At
the time, he was staying with the smuggler who had arranged for
his entry into Egypt. The smuggler, known as Rashad, agreed to
bring him to a clinic, provided he was compensated once he had
started working. According to Zarif, Rashad brought him to a num-
ber of clinics where preliminary blood tests were conducted, which
he understood were to diagnose his medical condition. After he
went to four or five clinics (Zarif was quite vague on the details) he
eventually spoke to a doctor who assured him that he could per-
form a successful operation. When he regained consciousness, he
noticed a large scar across his abdominal area and his lower back.
He was told by a nurse that this was where an endoscope entered
to perform intestinal surgery. However, an ultrasound later con-
firmed that one of his kidneys was removed.
According to Zarif, he had no prior knowledge that his kid-
ney would be removed. Yet, having revealed that his intestinal
condition had also been treated, it would not be unreasonable to
question whether Zarif had in fact traded his kidney in return for
treatment; and more pertinently, for the services of Rashad. Con-
sidering that Zarif claims to have visited “three or four” clinics
for blood tests prior to his donation, it seems rather dubious to
conclude that his suspicions were not aroused at any point during
this process. Other cases were however less ambiguous. Grace
explained how she had been deceived by her then partner into
selling her kidney:
After three months living in Cairo I met a man and I moved
in with him shortly after. At the time I was working as a
house girl. When I was working there I hurt my back and
then I lost my job. My boyfriend took me to the hospital to
get my back fixed. The doctor never spoke to me. I saw the
doctor who did the operation on my back but my boyfriend
spoke to another doctor. The operation took around 12
hours. The back operation cost £30,000 LE. After the opera-
tion I noticed a large scar.
Grace continued:
He gave some money [amount not specified] but this went on
rent, children and food. School is 1000 LE per month for
pre-school. After 3 months all the money was finished. Now, I
feel tired most of the time and I cannot do any heavy work.
According to Grace, this particular man had sold his kidney on
a previous occasion and was now working for the clinic as an organ
broker. Subsequently, Grace had been informed that her former
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partner had moved in with another woman shortly after her opera-
tion. This woman had also, allegedly, had her kidney removed.
Experiencing Exploitation: The Failure of Crime and
Immigration Controls
In 2010, the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act
was established in Egypt, primarily out of concern that the sale of
Egyptian kidneys and livers to foreign tourists was bringing
“shame” and “humiliation” on the nation (Hamdy 2012). Howev-
er, despite the legislative prohibition on the organ trade and the
establishment of an oversight committee charged with enforcing
the strict provisions of the Act, commercial transplants have per-
sisted within Egypt. All of the respondents, interviewed as part of
this study, had sold a kidney after this law was passed. In the
same year, Law No. (64) of 2010 Regarding Combatting Human
Trafficking included “the removal of organs” as a form of exploi-
tation. Notwithstanding Egypt’s reputation as a hot spot of organ
“trafficking” (see WHO 2007) at the time of writing, no victims
have been identified or assisted.
The respondents in this study had travelled to Egypt in
search of better employment options and living conditions. Nev-
ertheless, they were classified as asylum seekers and subject to
the UNHCR registration process. With limited access to employ-
ment, residency, and/or education, they were left with little choice
but to find ways to help themselves. In this context, selling or
arranging the sale of a kidney was an option worth considering.
It was their lack of bargaining power and inability to find gainful
employment that ultimately led to their exploitation in organ
markets. While the majority of respondents regretted selling a
kidney, it was not the horror of organ sale that they wanted to
communicate. Rather it was their lack of support in a precarious
environment with little or no opportunity for social mobility.
Each of the respondents decried their marginal status and inabili-
ty to generate an income. Disenfranchised and relegated to the
marginal spaces of the informal economy, they had limited or no
access to housing, education, healthcare, or employment. Subject
to their marginalized status their reports of abuse were not taken
seriously. Reports of corruption and a lack of accountability were
common, raising serious questions about the UNHCR registra-
tion process and the integrity of Egyptian law enforcement. As
Mahmoud, a Sudanese construction worker, aged 21, explained:
I do not regret this. If I had some support, I would not have
to do this [sell a kidney]. We need protection here. I was
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robbed when I came here; my passport and money was all
taken. We are targeted by everyone because they know that
we are suffering. There is no protection for us from the gov-
ernment or anyone.
Many of the respondents had taken great risks in order to
come to Cairo. Large sums of money (i.e., $5,000 USD) were
needed to pay smugglers and secure travel often under cramped
and unsafe conditions, with some facing brutality, and hardship
along the way. Selling a kidney was another aspect of this jour-
ney; part of a wider struggle to advance their life choices. While
some of the respondents had their kidney’s removed under
fraudulent circumstances, the majority were under no illusion as
to what is was they were doing. Some had even been prepared
for the extremity of death, but were willing to forfeit their life if
it meant helping their families. Considerations of legality or con-
sent held little meaning for them.
The person who convinced me had sold his kidney, but now
this man is dead. He told me that everything was good, that
if I sell my kidney your life will be good. You will get money
to help your family. How could I change my mind? I have to
support my family. This is not any kind of choice. My chil-
dren will suffer if I do not do this.
(Sudanese migrant, male, Cairo)
Stripped of their agency, migrants can be redefined as refu-
gees, “illegal” migrants, victims, and/or criminals, legitimizing
mechanisms of control that put them at risk of exploitation. Clas-
sified into different migrant types and objectified as external
agents their histories are unwritten and attention is focused else-
where. With regard to the exploitation of migrants, political
attention has largely focused on the activities of smuggling net-
works that are often conflated with human trafficking (Aronowitz
2001; Salt 2000). There has been relatively less attention paid to
the laws and policies of destination states where many individuals
are ultimately exploited. In the Egyptian context, it seems clear
that more services and support for housing, health, childcare,
and education are needed for migrant groups. Especially given
the current (2016) political climate across the Middle East and
North Africa, the numbers of migrants in Cairo are increasing.
More generally, increased labor informalization and the precari-
ous working conditions that leave people exposed to exploitation
of various kinds need to be addressed. As Katie Meagher (2014)
points out clandestine trading activities are having an increasingly
negative impact on local security and development. Furthermore,
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while there has been an emphasis on increasing organ supplies
(see Declaration of Istanbul 2008; WHO 2010), there has been
relatively less attention on limiting the risk of organ failure. At a
minimum, re-focusing efforts on reducing demand for transplant
services would seem more sensible than imposing ineffective
criminal sanctions. If health care were to be supported more gen-
erally and broadly, then solutions for the prevention of organ fail-
ure would be the focus of medical intervention; not transplant
programs with limited accessibility.
There is little to suggest that law enforcement measures are
of any tangible benefit to individuals or groups exposed to
exploitative practices, in various forms and degrees. Rather the
rhetorical imaging of crime control policies, conveyed as a bul-
wark against a nefarious criminal order, act as a form of social
control managing public expectations (see Cohen 1985). More-
over, these policies relieve the state of pressure to address the
types of social inequalities that subject people to exploitation.
Organ markets have not produced an economic underclass; they
are a condition of it. Selling a kidney is one aspect of a wider
process of exploitation and a person’s position in the social struc-
ture. While it is debatable as to whether or not the Egyptian state
has either the capacity or interest to implement the relevant stat-
utory provisions, it is unlikely that this will have any significant
impact on the existence of organ markets.
The organ trade cannot be reduced to a singular criminal act.
It is a particular expression of exploitation, linked to a process of
social exclusion. Sudanese migrants, and indeed other migrant
groups, experience this process through legal barriers to full citi-
zenship embedded in the daily struggle to survive. Existing atten-
tion to immigration and crime control limit the existential scope
of exploitation and re-orient critical attention away from the
social and economic arrangements that perpetuate patterns of
social exclusion. This social exclusion supports the emergence of
organ markets. If the law is to have any impact on organ trading
and indeed other forms of exploitation, it must first address the
structural asymmetries that compel individuals to submit to the
will of others. While it may prove impossible to eradicate organ
markets, the legal barriers and policy decisions that predispose
people toward organ sale can be addressed.
Conclusion
The empirical findings presented in this paper provide a con-
textual analysis of organ trading in Egypt, demonstrating how
organ markets and the networks that supply them are embedded
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and implicated in local political cultures and socio-economic
arrangements. From this analysis, it is clear that if policy makers
are serious about preventing the organ trade the legal barriers,
policy decisions, and economic conditions that stimulate organ
markets will need to be addressed. The Sudanese migrants who
participated in this study were compelled to sell a kidney due to
economic pressures, intensified by precarious labor market condi-
tions and exclusionary migrant policies. Existing criminal mea-
sures in response to the organ trade do not capture or respond
to this empirical reality. For the majority of respondents, selling a
kidney was a reaction to failed state policies (centered on public
health, immigration, and crime control) and the social malaise
that follows. This was evident in the narratives of various
respondents who explained why or how they had agreed to sell
one of their kidneys.
According to Mitra and Biller-Andorno (2013), exploitation is
a way of taking advantage of vulnerabilities embedded within
existing structural injustices. We must then look to the context in
which vulnerability is grounded. There seems little sense in crimi-
nalizing individuals who are responding to challenging social con-
ditions in a context of failed state policies. Limiting the level of
exploitation organ sellers are exposed to will not be achieved by
establishing more punitive measures; largely ignored in states lack-
ing the resources or political will to arrest and prosecute suspected
offenders. The organ trade is an effect of deeper structural causes,
outside the scope of criminal intervention. For the respondents
interviewed as part of this study, selling a kidney was an economic
option of last resort. Morality or ethics played no part in their
decision. More support is needed, not incrimination.
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